PRICE EXPECTATIONS by business are an integral part of the process by which inflation maintains or alters its momentum. Empirical studies of price expectations in the United States, however, have relied mainly on surveys of professional forecasters or of households. Useful though these studies are, the absence of studies of price expectations by businessmen has been a serious omission.
goods and slightly fewer answer the sales price question. Of these firms, about 1,200 are in manufacturing industries; 300 are in mining and construction; 600 are in trade industries; and 1,100 are in the rest of the economy. The industry price changes reported below are weighted averages of company responses. Weights reflect the survey's sampling fraction for three size groupings in each industry, and the level of capital spending of individual companies (in aggregating capital goods price changes) and sales (in aggregating sales price changes).
Little is known about the quality of the responses to the price question. The responses to the inquiry about past price changes at the two-digit industry level generally correlate highly with percentage changes derived from official price indexes for the same industries. However, it is hard to imagine that respondents know as much about price changes in their companies, especially in the case of diversified firms, as they do about capital expenditures, sales, or other income-statement items.
In this paper we describe and analyze ten years of observations of the responses on sales price expectations for seventeen industries and capital goods price expectations for twenty-three industries. We first present data highlights, including statistics on errors in expectations by industry and by year. We then report on some standard tests of the rational expectations hypothesis and on tests of other hypotheses about expectations. It is our hope that other students of price expectations will be stimulated to use and analyze the data further.
Data Highlights
Business expectations about price changes have been rising irregularly since 1970. As table 1 shows, aggregate expectations about sales prices began slightly below 4 percent in 1971, fell slightly during the period of 1972-73 controls, rose rapidly to more than 8 percent following the price shocks of 1973 and 1974, and then declined in 1976 to just over 6 percent.' They stabilized near 6 percent for several years, but in 1980 resumed their rise and exceeded 10 percent for the first time in 1981. Expected changes in capital goods prices were greater than in sales prices a. The first two columns represent an aggregate of sales prices for manufacturing and utilities; other industrips are omitted because of lack of sufficient data. The reported price changes for sales differ from changes in widely used measures of aggregate price change (for example, the change in the GNP deflator) primarily because of these omissions and because primary product prices receive more weight in the calculation of sales prices than they do in the GNP deflator.
b. The expected price change for year t (for example, 1971) is the percent change in prices from year t -1 (1970) to year t expected at the end of year t -1.
c. The reported price change for year t is the percent change in prices from year t -1 to year t reported at the end of year t. throughout the period but showed a similar pattern of change over time. The table suggests a clear influence of recent actual inflationary behavior on expectations for the year ahead.
Errors in expectations vary greatly by industry and by year. As table 2 shows, root-mean-square errors in sales price expectations by industry range from a little more than 1 percentage point for aircraft to slightly more than 20 points for petroleum. By year, the range (based on seventeen industries for each year) is from less than 1 percentage point in 1972 and 1978 to more than 16 points in 1974. The errors tend to be smaller for capital goods prices than for sales prices.
The errors in expectations tend to be smaller than the errors that would result from simply assuming that the most recently observed rate of price increase will continue; but this improvement over a "samechange" assumption does not hold for every industry group or every year. Theil's U-statistic, shown in table 2, registers zero if there are no errors in expectations and 100 if the expected price change is always 
Tests of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis
An important analytical use of the data is to test the rational expectations hypothesis about price change-that is, the hypothesis that the differences between expected and actual rates of price change do not exhibit any systematic pattern, but instead constitute a random variable with zero mean. It is this hypothesis, in combination with some special assumptions about the nature of other macroeconomic relations, that can lead to the conclusion that inflation rates need not have any continuity or momentum but can be altered drastically with little or no impact on real output.2 Table 3 shows the results of two widely employed tests of the rational expectations hypothesis applied to the pooled industry-time series data of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The first is a test of whether, in a linear regression of actual price change on expected price change, the coefficient of expected price change differs significantly from 1.0 and the constant term differs significantly from zero. This is a test for bias in expectations. The second is a test of whether, in a regression of actual price change on expected price change and other variables widely known at the time expectations were reported, the latter variables have significant coefficients. This is a test for the efficiency of expectations; if actual price change is related to these other variables as well as to the reported expectations, reported expectations must not have made efficient use of all widely known information.
The rational expectations hypothesis fares poorly in these tests. The first two rows of table 3 3. There is also a statistical basis for omitting 1974. An F-test of the hypothesis underlying the pooled regressions, namely that coefficients in a regression of actual on expected price changes are equal for all industries, indicated that for sales prices the hypothesis could be rejected with 95 percent confidence when 1974 was included but not when 1974 was omitted. The hypothesis could not be rejected for capital goods prices, with or without 1974. prices is less than 1.0. However, for both sets of prices, with or without 1974, the F-ratios in the last column of the table indicate, with more than 99 percent confidence, that the hypothesis of unbiased errors must be rejected.
The fifth through eighth rows report the results of tests for efficiencynamely, tests for the significance of primary-product capacity utilization and of changes in money supply when they are included in a regression of actual price change on expected price change. Capacity utilization and changes in money supply are the only two variables we tested in our analysis of the efficiency of expectations, although they are clearly only two of a host of variables that might influence actual and expected price changes.
The capacity-utilization variable for capital goods prices in every industry was specified as capacity utilization for durable goods materials in the third quarter of the year at the end of which the price expectations were'reported. This was also the capacity-utilization variable for sales prices in durable goods industries. For the textiles, paper, chemicals, rubber, and "other nondurables" industries the utilization variable for sales price was capacity utilization for nondurable goods materials in the third quarter of the year at the end of which the price expectations were reported. For other nondurable goods industries-food and beverage, petroleum, electric utilities, and gas and other utilities-a cyclical effect of capacity utilization appeared unlikely. A dummy variable, equal to 1.0 for these industries and zero for the others, was used to prevent the capacity utilization variables from disturbing the estimates of other coefficients.
The money supply variable we used was percent change from the previous year in Ml before the 1980 revision, the money variable most widely publicized during the 1970s. Because the variable is used with lags, we did not need to choose among the new concepts introduced in 1980.
In three of the four equations including lagged capacity utilization (equations 3-5, 3-7, 3-11 ) the t-ratios for utilization are above 2.0. Even in the fourth (equation 3-9), while the individual coefficients for capacity utilization and for the dummy variable used in food, petroleum, and utilities have t-ratios below 2.0, a test of their joint significance indicates with greater than 95 percent confidence that jointly they have a positive A second econometric problem is that the pooled regression results reflect both changes over time and differences among industries; but for macroeconomic analysis we are interested mainly in changes over time. To focus the results on the time dimension, we calculated regressions including industry dummy variables. Almost none of the dummy variables was significant, and none of the conclusions based on the reported regressions was altered by the results including the dummy variables.
A third problem is that because errors in expectations tend to have the same movements over time in many industries (for example, price expectations were too low in 1974 for almost every industry), the assumption of zero covariances among error terms is suspect. To address this problem, we applied a variance-components model to the first two regressions reported in table 3. Again, none of the conclusions was changed by this procedure. 
Tests of the Error-Learning Hypothesis
Most empirical and many theoretical macroeconomic models employ the hypothesis of adaptive expectations-that is, the hypothesis that current price expectations reflect a distributed lag of the past actual behavior of prices. The hypothesis of adaptive expectations supports the conclusion that past inflation rates have strong momentum, and that attempts to reduce current-dollar output will initially have a heavy impact on real output rather than on prices.
A simple form of the hypothesis of adaptive expectations is the errorlearning model.5 According to this model, expectations about an economic variable are revised in light of the most recently observed error. Thus if pt is the actual percent change in prices in period t, and p" is the percent change in prices that was expected as of the end of the previous period t -1, the error-learning hypothesis states that the change in expected value from t -1 to t, (p" -phl), depends on the error made in the previous period, (pti -pr-). In linear form, the hypothesis is a. The dependent variable, p', is the expected price change in percent from year t -1 to year t reported at the end of year t -1. The explanatory variables pg-i and p'_1 are, respectively, actual price change in percent from t -2 to t -1 reported at the end of t -1, and the expected price change in percent from t-2 to t -1 reported at the end of t -2. 
Tests of an Augmented Error-Learning Model
Following the lead of other investigators, we tested an error-learning model augmented by three other explanatory variables: change in the rate of price increase from two years ago to one year ago, lagged capacity utilization (together with the dummy variables for individual industries described earlier), and lagged rates of change in the money supply one year ago and two years ago. Results are shown in table 5.
The three variables are of interest because they all have implications for the cost (in lost output) of reducing inflation. A positive coefficient for the variable denoting change in price increase implies that reductions in rates of price increase themselves develop a momentum that speeds up the process of moving to a lower target rate of inflation (accelerations of price increases have the opposite effect). Adding this variable takes a step toward the complex dynamic models of adaptive expectations that have been tested in recent studies.9 A positive coefficient for capacity utilization implies that a recession will lower price expectations directly as well as indirectly through its effect on current market prices. A positive coefficient for changes in the money supply implies that reduced money growth will lower price expectations directly in addition to its influence on the supply of credit.
Clearly these three variables are only a sample of the possible ways of representing price dynamics, cyclical variations in resource utilization, and the effects of policy announcements. To mention just two omissions, there is no representation of fiscal policy and no attempt to measure a "policy credibility" effect. In sum, our initial analysis of price expectation data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis does not support the rational expectations hypothesis, gives only limited support to a simple error-learning model, and provides mixed results for an augmented error-learning model including past changes in the rate of increase of prices, capacity utilization, and changes in money supply. One positive finding is a strong association between expected price change and the most recently observed price change.
Discussion
A DETAILED EXAMINATION of expectations by firms, rather than their expectations averaged to the industry level, was suggested by Christopher Sims to provide a better test of rationality and other characteristics of forecasts. There might be bias in the regressions by industry because, at the time they forecast, firms do not know the industry averages that are treated as "known" in interpreting the industry regressions. On the basis of similar studies on sales expectations, Michael Lovell conjectured that disaggregating the analysis to the firm level would make the results depart even further from the predictions of the rational expectations model. Stanley Fischer added that a disaggregated study of the Michigan survey data revealed far less rationality than the averages from that survey implied. At times in the past decade, about one-fourth of the sample expected no change in prices. Robert Hall noted that, in addition to attributing industry knowledge to the firm, the test for rationality presumed the forecasters had knowledge of a relation between capacity utilization and forecast errors that may not have existed at the time the forecasts were made. Benjamin Friedman agreed in principle with Hall, but did not believe the objection was forceful because capacity utilization was a well-known variable whose relation to pricing had been discussed for a long time before the sample period. Michael McKelvey added that estimating a rolling regression made little difference to the findings.
Friedman observed that the present results were in line with studies of other economic variables, such as interest rates or wage expectations, which quite consistently have rejected the rationality hypothesis. Robert Gordon added that the results supported the importance of backwardlooking expectations formation. There is inertia in the economy's adjustment process not simply because of a wage-wage spiral based on catch-up, but also because price expectations are based upon extrapolation of recent experience.
Several panel members discussed the puzzling differences in performance of expectations in the sales and capital goods equations. Franco Modigliani noted that capital goods prices are predicted better than sales prices and speculated that it might be because they refer to deliveries already contracted for. McKelvey noted capital goods prices might simply be easier to forecast because their variance is smaller. Robin Marris reasoned there might be a downward bias on sales prices expectations, as compared with input prices, because people do not like to say their own prices will be increased. William Brainard explained that the downward bias in sales expectations could reflect the fact that firms reporting their own price increases are not fully aware of the (correlated) pricing decisions of other firms. The fact that the competition is also raising prices leads these reporting firms to increase their own prices more than they had expected. Although a parallel argument would help explain the upward bias in capital goods expectations, Brainard found it less plausible. James Tobin noted that both biases are consistent with forecasters building in a risk premium by making predictions less favorable to the firm than their expectations.
